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The Concurrent State and Local Regulation of 
Marijuana: The Validity of the Ann Arbor 
Marijuana Ordinance 
The City Council of Ann Arbor, Michigan, has recently amended 
the City's "marijuana ordinance" so that it prohibits the possession, 
control, use, giving away, or sale of marijuana, and specifies a five 
dollar fine as punishment for violations of the ordinance.1 The State 
of Michigan has also legislated to prohibit marijuana-related activi-
ties, specifying a number of different offenses with penalties ranging 
as high as four years in prison, or a 2,000 dollar fine, or both.2 By 
1. ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CODE, tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972): 
No person shall: Have in his or her possession or under his or her control or 
use or give away or sell marijuana or cannabis which is defined as all parts of the 
plant cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin ex-
tracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, deriva• 
tive, mixture or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin. It does not include 
the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made 
from the seeds of the plant, any other compounds, manufacture, sale, derivative, 
mixture or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, 
fiber oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germina• 
tion, unless such possession, control or use is pursuant to a license or prescription 
as provided in Public Act 196 of 1971, as amended. 
Any violation of this Section shall be subject to a sentence of up to five dollars 
($5.00) including judgment fee and costs, and no probation or any other punitive 
or rehabilitative measure shall be imposed; provided, however, that this Section 
shall not be construed to prohibit deferred sentencing. The District Court Clerk 
shall accept any plea of guilty which is made in the same manner as pleas of 
guilty are accepted at the parking Violations Bureau of the Fifteenth District 
Court. Persons pleading guilty of violation of this Section shall be allowed to 
tender the sum of five dollars ($5.00) to the District Court Clerk as a full and com• 
plete satisfaction of liability, and no appearance before a District Judge shall be 
required. In any prosecution for the violation of this section the burden of estab-
lishing any license or prescription shall be upon the defendant but this does not 
shift the burden of proof for the violation. 
The City Council of the City of Ann Arbor specifically determines that the reg-
ulations herein contained concerning marijuana are necessary to serve the local 
purpose of providing just and equitable legal treatment of the citizens of this com-
munity, and in particular of the youth of the community who are present here as 
University students or otherwise, and to preserve the respect of citizens for the law 
and its processes. 
2, The Controlled Substances Act of 1971, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.301-.867 
(Supp. 1972) provides an extensive regulation of drugs in Michigan. MICH. COMP. Uws 
ANN. § 335.341 (Supp. 1972) states: 
(1) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance, 
Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: 
(c) • : •• marijuana, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned 
for not more than 4 years or fined not more than $2,000.00, or both, 
(2) Possession of more than 2 ounces of marijuana is prima fade evidence of pos-
session with intent to deliver. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled 
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting m the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act, Any person who violates 
this subsection with respect to: 
(d) • Marijuana, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 
[400] 
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enacting the ordinance, the City government has minimized the crim-
inal sanctions for an activity it has found essentially benign, pursuant 
to certain local purposes.8 Since, however, there is concurrent exer-
cise of control over marijuana by both a municipality and the State 
several issues for judicial determination arise concerning the consti-
tutionality of the local ordinance.4 Michigan cities are authorized by 
constitution and by statute to act only with respect to local concerns, 
and thus the courts must first determine whether the Ann Arbor 
marijuana ordinance deals with a "municipal concern" as defined by 
law. If the ordinance is found to deal with a problem within the am-
bit of permissible local authority, the courts must then consider 
whether the state legislation in the area of marl juana control has pre-
empted the field, rendering ultra vires any municipal efforts at addi-
tional control. If the state marijuana laws are found to be nonpre-
emptive, then the Ann Arbor ordinance will be allowed to stand un-
less it is found to be "in conflict" with the provisions of the state law. 
In addition, the question arises whether the coexistence of the ordi-
nance and the statute vests an impermissible degree of discretion in 
the prosecuting officer. Finally, in order to evaluate the impact of the 
ordinance it must be determined whether successive prosecutions by 
the City and the State for the same illegal activities would constitute 
double jeopardy in violation of the constitutions of Michigan or the 
United States. 
Beyond the immediate interest of the City of Ann Arbor, the ad-
judication of the constitutionality of the ordinance will be significant 
as a measure of the extent to which municipalities may proceed at 
variance with state law in effecting independent responses to prob-
lems that relate to both local and statewide interests. 
not more than I year in the county jail or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00, 
or both. 
(5) It is unlawful for a person to use a controlled substance unless the substance 
was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as 
otherwise authorized by this act. Any person who violates this subsection with 
respect to: 
(d) Marijuana is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than 90 days in the county jail or by a fine of not more than $100.00, or 
both. 
In addition MICH. Co.MP. LAws .ANN. § 385.346(2) (Supp. 1972) provides that 
any person who distributes marijuana without remuneration and not to further 
commercial distribution and who does not violate subsection (I) is guilty of a mis• 
demeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than I year in the 
county jail or fined not more than $1,000.00, or both, unless the distribution is 
in accordance with federal law or the law of this state. 
Subsection (I) of this provision authorized penalties double those listed in section 
335.341(1) for the distribution of a controlled substance by a person over 18 years of 
age to a person under 18 who is at least 5 years his junior. 
3. See notes 26-36 infra and accompanying text. 
4. See generally Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 
72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 737 (1959). 
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The enactment of the home-rule provisions of Michigan, as in 
many other states, was presumably in response to the unsatisfactory 
condition of city-state relations during the latter part of the nine-
teenth century;5 state legislatures of the period, which were con-
trolled by the rural populace, were notorious for meddling in munic-
ipal affairs and for their abuses of the so-called "special acts" relating 
to cities.6 The home-rule amendments to the constitutions of the 
various states may be self-executing,7 or may require or authorize the 
legislature to enact enabling home-rule legislation.8 
The states have also manifested variations in the scope of the 
home-rule powers afforded the cities. The California constitution, 
for example, empowers cities to enact and enforce ordinances in re-
spect to municipal affairs, "subject only to the restrictions and limita-
tions provided in their several charters .... "9 This language has been 
interpreted by the California courts to give cities supreme control 
over municipal affairs. Indeed, the cities are "independent of general 
laws upon municipal affairs. Upon such affairs the general law is of 
no force."10 Michigan, on the other hand, has granted to cities the 
home-rule powers over municipal concerns, "subject to the constitu-
tion and general laws of the state."11 Unlike California's home-rule 
cities, municipalities in Michigan exercise concurrent control with 
the State over matters of municipal concern, and the state authority is 
supreme. The operative effect of the home-rule provisions of any 
state depends, however, upon the judicial interpretation of the scope 
of the home-rule powers. Thus, the broad constitutional grant of 
power to California cities is limited by the judicial construction 
given to the concept of "municipal affairs."12 Conversely, though 
5. A. BROMAGE, INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL GoVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 157 
(1950). 
6. Id. The concept of home-rule is consonant with the emphasis on "community 
control'' which has recently arisen in education as well as in other areas. Cf. Kirp, 
Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REY. 1389 
(1970). Home-rule and local control are intended to guard against arbitrary legislation 
by keeping decision-making close to the people to be governed. Fordham, Decision-
Making in Expanding American Urban Life, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 274, 275 (1960). As one 
conmmentator has observed: 
Municipal Government has at least two advantages over state government. A 
municipal administration is more responsive to the needs of local citizens, since 
it must depend exclusively on these people for re-election. Second, a local govern-
ment is more efficient to the extent that efficiency is increased by closeness to the 
scene of operations and accessibility to the criticism and suggestions of the 
persons governed. 
Note, supra note 4, at 740. See also Fordham &: Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory 
and Practice, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 18 (1948). 
7. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 18. 
8. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22. 
9. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8. 
10. Wiley v. City of Berkeley, 136 Cal. App. 2d 10, 12, 288 P.2d 123, 125 (1955). 
11. MICH, CoMl'. LAWS ANN.§ 117.4j(3) (1967). 
12. The California courts have observed that there is no precise definition of 
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Michigan's home-rule provisions are not among the most extensive 
as written, the Michigan courts have interpreted the provisions to al-
low a vigorous exercise of local authority by Michigan cities. 
The source of the home-rule powers of Michigan cities is article 
7, section 22, of the Michigan constitution: 
Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have 
the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and 
to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted 
or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. 
Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and 
ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and govern-
ment, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers 
granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict 
the general grant of authority conferred by this section.13 
This provision is not of the "self-executing" type, and therefore the 
constitutional grant of power is implemented through Michigan's 
home-rule statutes, which delegate to home-rule cities, such as Ann 
Arbor, the authority to act 
to advance the interests of the city, the good government and pros-
perity of the municipality and its inhabitants and through its reg-
ularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating 
to its municipal concerns subject to the constitution and general 
laws of the state.14 
"municipal affairs." Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. App. 2d 146, 154, 217 P.2d 
704, 708 (1950). Instead, the determination is one of degree. Certain concerns may 
be characterized as "strictly" or "essentially" municipal affairs, while others may be 
"partaking of the characteristics of a municipal affair" and yet encompass a far 
greater scope of interest than strictly municipal matters. Brewer v. Feigenbaum, 47 
Cal. App. 2d 171, 176, 117 P.2d 737, 740 (1941). If there is any reasonable doubt as to 
whether a particular matter is a municipal affair, the courts will resolve the matter 
against the municipality and deny the power. Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock, 97 Cal. 
App. 2d at 154, 217 P.2d at 709. 
Municipal control over municipal affairs is "independent of general laws" (see 
text accompanying note 10 supra) only when a matter is exclusively a municipal 
affair. The independence disappears as statewide interests begin to coincide with local 
interests. As the California supreme court recently noted in Lancaster v. Municipal 
Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, - Cal. 3d -, 
494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 610 (1972): 
[A] local municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional require-
ments in a field that is pre-empted by general law. • • • Local legislation in 
conflict with general law JS void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates • • • 
contradicts ••• or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly 
or by legislative implication • • • • If the subject matter or field of the legis-
lation has been fully occupied by the state, there is no room for supplementary 
or complementary local legislation, even if the subject were otherwise one properly 
characterized as a "municipal affair." 
Comparing the law of California with that of Michigan (see notes 12-23 supra 
and accompanying text) it becomes apparent that despite the constitutional variations 
in the scope of power, the practical powers of California and Michigan cities are 
str.ikingly similar. 
13. MICH. CoNST, art. 7, § 22. 
14. MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN. § 117.4j(3) (1967). 
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Both the statute and the constitution expressly limit home-rule 
powers to control over areas of "municipal concern," a concept that 
does not encourage facile definition. There has been a certain ten-
dency in Michigan to link the municipal concern idea with the scope 
of the police power.15 It has been held that except as limited by the 
constitution or by statute the police power of home-rule cities is "of 
the same general scope and nature as that of the State."16 This po-
lice power has been broadly defined and allows the flexibility neces-
sary to deal with changing problems.17 The enacting body has the 
discretion to determine what regulations are appropriate to protect 
the public interest;18 and a person asserting the unconstitutionality 
of a municipal ordinance has the burden of showing that it has no 
real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, or gen-
eral welfare.19 
Yet, the fact that a locality can assert some measure of municipal 
interest in an area of control does not necessarily bring that area 
within the ambit of permissible local authority under the meaning 
of the "municipal concern" language of the constitution and the en-
abling statute. Most problems are of concern both to the State and 
the cities, and the inquiry focuses on the degree to which one or the 
other might be concerned, or perhaps which entity has the primary 
concern. As one commentator has observed: 
15. See, e.g., Watnick v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 600, 113 N.W .2d 867 (1962); 
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W.2d 888 (1959), 
afjd., 362 U.S. 440 (1960); People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Eanes 
v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W. 896 (1937). 
16. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 315, 17 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1945). A rather narrow 
view of municipal powers was expounded in the early cases of Attorney General v. 
City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 631, 196 N.W. 391 (1923), and City of Kalamazoo v. Titus, 
208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919). Attorney General v. City of Detroit held that a 
municipality exercised the police power only as an agent of the State, and in such 
capacity it could not set state policy by regulating areas of statewide concern. This 
concept precluded local wage and hour regulation in Attorney General v. City of 
Detroit, and local fixing of public utility rates in Titus, People v. Sell upheld a 
Detroit ordinance enforcing federally set wartime price ceilings on commodities. This 
ordinance can be viewed as a local exercise of the police power in an area of statewide 
concern. But the impact of Sell as precedent is limited by the court's reliance on the 
wartime emergency circumstances which necessitated the ordinance, as well as the 
fact that it merely augmented a state price ceiling statute which was already in effect. 
17. In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 315-16, 17 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1945), the Michi-
gan supreme court stated: 
The "police power" is • • • a power or organization of a system of regulations 
tending to the health, order, convenience, and comfort of the people and to the 
prevention and punishment of injuries and offenses to the public •••• It embraces 
all rules and regulations for the protection of life and the security of property 
• • . • It has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions 
affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "the 
greatest good of the greatest number." Courts have consistently and wisely de• 
dined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this 
power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions 
demand correction. 
18. Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939). 
19. Austin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938). 
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The courts have, generally speaking, been unable to devise any 
objective test whereby it can be determined with certainty what 
matters come within the term "municipal affairs," for the term has 
no fixed quantity, fluctuates with every change in the conditions 
upon which it operates, and has of necessity been determined by a 
slow process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.20 
The elusive nature of the municipal concern idea may justify the 
Michigan courts' unwillingness to propose expansive or general defi-
nitions. The issue is more amenable to a subtle balancing process, 
weighing the sometimes conflicting interests of the cities and the 
state, considering the advantages to be derived in each case from 
broader local powers as opposed to more uniform regulation by the 
state. For example, a court might properly weigh the relative effi-
ciency of local and state governments in the regulation of any given 
activity, the interest of local citizens in responsive implementation of 
local policies, and the possibility that local ordinances will interfere 
with the operation of statewide objectives or procedures. Such bal-
ancing of state and local interests seems implicit in decisions of the 
municipal concern issue; but whereas the balancing process is out-
lined in decisions of other jurisdictions,21 the Michigan courts have 
not overtly subscribed to this approach.22 In any event, the municipal 
concern question has traditionally been dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis in Michigan, resulting in lists of inclusion and exclusion.23 
20. C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 64 (1957). 
21. E.g., State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukee, 231 Ore. 473, 480-85, 373 P.2d 
680, 684-87 (1962). 
22. In a slightly different context the Michigan supreme court made some observa-
tions that may be pertinent to the municipal concern issue. In Miller v. Fabius Twp. 
Bd., 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962), the court addressed the issue of whether the 
regulation of water skiing was a problem susceptible to local control under what is now 
MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 41.181 (1967), a statute defining the scope of a township's 
authority to enact ordinances. The court noted: 
'While the general problem with reference to water skiing and motorboating 
and the use of our inland lakes by different classes of sportsmen are statewide 
problems, there are peculiar circumstances that are local in character-such as 
the number of boat users on the lake; the amount of fishing on the lake; the 
congestion and conflict between fishermen and water skiers; the location of the 
lake to densely populated areas-which the 1959 amendment authorizes townships 
to deal with under the "health and safety of persons and property" clause. 
366 Mich. at 259, 114 N.W.2d at 209 (emphasis added). Although the court did not 
explicitly balance the state interest in regulation against the local interest, it recog-
nized that even in areas of statewide concern, peculiar local circumstances may create 
a need for local regulation. Such an analysis might be equally applicable to the 
municipal concern question and might well produce results similar to a balancing 
approach. 
23. The Michigan courts have found the following areas to be within the scope of 
the "municipal concern" requirement: Watnick v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 600, 113 
N.W.2d 876 (1962) (Sunday closing laws); Huron-Portland Cement Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W .2d 888 (1959), affd., 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (air pollution); 
People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945) (municipal enforcement of federal 
wartime commodity controls); Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W .2d 
896 (1937) (regulation of barber shops). 
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In determining whether the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance 
deals with an area of municipal concern, it must be noted that the 
same strong presumption of constitutionality applies to a city ordi-
nance as to a state statute,24 and such presumption must be overcome 
by a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.2is 
In response to an opinion by Attorney General Frank Kelly,26 
and in an effort to comply expressly with the municipal concern re-
quirement, the City Council of Ann Arbor inserted in the ordinance 
a section that specifically identifies a local problem.27 The ordinance 
speaks of a particular concern for the youth of the community, "pre-
sent here as University students or otherwise," and seeks to "preserve 
the respect of such citizens for the law and its processes. "28 J us-
tice Williams of the Michigan supreme court has suggested that ra-
tional legislation with respect to marijuana should serve this same 
purpose.29 The Council may also have recognized a widespread use 
of marijuana within the City, and acted to prevent the strain on 
community relations between youth and the police that might have 
resulted were enforcement of harsh state penalties to continue.30 A 
related aspect of this problem is the criminalization of the City's citi-
zens who use marijuana; such citizens, through fear of enforcement 
of the strict state laws might come to regard the police as adversaries, 
rather than as public servants who can be relied upon for aid and 
The case law has held the following to be of statewide concern, thus beyond the 
regulatory power of municipalities: Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 
631, 196 N.W. 391 (1923) (regulation of hours of labor and the minimum wage); City 
of Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919) (fixing of rates for public 
utilities). The Michigan courts generally have not invalidated ordinances on the 
ground that they do not relate to municipal concerns. The tendency has been to find 
that where the legislature has acted with regard to areas of statewide concern, such 
statutes are pre-emptive. See, e.g., City of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-operative Dairy, 
330 Mich. 694, 48 N.W .2d 362 (1951). 
24. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 314, 17 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1945). See also Goldstein 
v. City of Hamtramck, 227 Mich. 263, 198 N.W. 962 (1924). 
25. Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 505, 286 N.W. 805, 807 (1939): 
A statute will be presumed to be constitutional by the courts unless the contrary 
clearly appears; and in case of doubt every possible presumption not clearly 
inconsistent with the language and subject matter is to be made in favor of the 
constitutionality of legislation •••• [I]t is only when invalidity appears so clearly 
as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the 
Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. 
See also text accompanying note 19 supra. 
26. MlcH. ATTY. GEN. OP., March 9, 1971. 
27. See note I supra. 
28. ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CODE tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972), set out in note I 
supra. 
29. People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 130-31, 194 N.W .2d 878, 895 (1972) (concurring 
opinion). 
30. See J. KAPLIN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION 33-36, 39-40 (1970); H. PACKER, 
THE LIMrrs OF nm CRIMINAL SANCTION 340-41 (1968); Note, Possession of Marijuana 
in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L REv. 101, 118-21 
(1968). 
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protection.81 This attitude could diminish community cooperation 
with the police in other, perhaps more critical, areas of police work. 
By reducing the marijuana penalties, the City has de-emphasized the 
offense, a result of which could not only be an improvement in 
police-community relations hut also a reordering of enforcement pri-
orities and a reallocation of police resources to more serious criminal 
activities. The ordinance may have been enacted in response to a 
growing lack of respect for the legal system among young people who 
believe that the marl juana prohibition is discriminatory because one 
class of persons is subjected to harsh criminal sanctions for the use 
of one recreational drug, marijuana, while another class of persons 
has general approval for the use of alcohol, another recreational 
drug.82 By reducing the stigma, the inconvenience, and the financial 
cost of a marijuana conviction, the City can claim to he minimizing 
a cause of citizen disrespect for the law and its processes.88 
There are, on the other hand, arguments for viewing marijuana 
regulation as a matter of statewide concern. The State can claim that 
Ann Arbor is not unique, that marijuana use in Ann Arbor is no 
less contrary to an expressed state policy than it is anywhere else in 
the State, and that uniform enforcement of state laws regulating the 
31. See authorities cited in note 30 supra. These local interests might satisfy the 
"peculiar circumstances" test that the court applied under the township statute if 
the court chose to extend this test to the "municipal concern" question under the 
home-rule provision of the constitution. See note 22 supra. 
32. In a concurring opinion in People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 105-15, 194 N.W.2d 
878, 881-87 (1972), Justice Swainson marshalled numerous studies and reports in 
a carefully documented comparison between the effects of marijuana and alcohol. 
Relying on THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE CANADIAN GoVERNMENT CO!d:MISSION OF INQUIRY, 
Tm: NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS 116-17, 122-23 (1970) [hereinafter CANADIAN COMMIS-
SION]; L. GRINSPOON, MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED 39-61 (1971); J. KAPLIN, supra note 30, 
at 139-41; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG .ABUSE 13-14, 25 (1967); REPORT BY THE: .AD-
VISORY COMMITrEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE 12-13, 16, 20-21 (1968) (British Report); Bonnie 
& Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the 
Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1105-07 (1970), 
he concluded that marijuana is not addictive, does not lead to the use of "hard" 
drugs, does not lead to violent crimes by the user, does not adversely affect psycho-
motor response (e.g., driving abilities), and has no adverse physical effects on the 
user. Citing the CANADIAN CoMMISSION at 43, 70-72, J. KAPLIN at 275-320, and the 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 35 (1967), he observed that alcohol, by comparison, is 
shown to be addictive, is clearly linked with the commission of violent crimes, and 
excessive use is associated with death of brain cells, mental deterioration, and cirrhosis 
of the liver. 
33. However, it is arguable that the very coexistence of two distinct penalty schemes 
applicable to the same conduct will in itself cause people to view the legal policies 
underlying the prohibition as somewhat schizophrenic. In addition, the local interests 
that Ann Arbor asserts may be different from the interests of the rest of the State 
only as a matter of degree due to the fact that there is a greater concentration of 
young people in Ann Arbor because of the presence of the University. This may sug-
gest that the limitation of marijuana offense penalties is really a matter of statewide 
concern which is simply more aggravated in Ann Arbor. 
408 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:400 
use of drugs is appropriate because of the statewide nature of the 
problem. By providing a shelter for marijuana violators, Ann Arbor 
may impede the ability of the State to suppress drug traffic through-
out the State. This last danger, however, will be minimized to the 
extent that the City exercises its retained discretion to accede to 
prosecution of "traffickers" under state law.3'1 Moreover, no reason 
appears why Ann Arbor's interest need be unique to justify control 
over a matter of great local significance. 
Under the suggested balancing approach, it would appear that 
there are legitimate local interests furthered by the Ann Arbor mari-
juana ordinance which may be sufficient to prevail over the state 
interests involved. Thus, the Ann Arbor marl juana ordinance is 
capable of meeting the constitutional requirement of relation to a 
"municipal concern." The Michigan courts, however, have not ex-
pressly engaged in balancing in their treatment of the "municipal 
concern" issue, but perhaps have merged these policy considerations 
into their analysis of pre-emption and conflict.85 Indeed, the Michi-
gan courts have decided the vast majority of the cases dealing with 
municipal ordinances without ever mentioning the municipal con-
cern requirement. The courts routinely uphold convictions under 
local ordinances, the implication being that such ordinances are 
valid exercises of the local police power, and the breadth accorded 
the concept of municipal concern has rendered this constitutional 
requirement somewhat ineffective as a limitation of the exercise of 
municipal powers. This is not to suggest that such powers are un-
limited. Rather, the Michigan courts have generally chosen to im-
pose the appropriate limits on local authority by invoking the doc-
trines of pre-emption and conflict. 
In light of Michigan's broad judicial interpretation of the munic-
ipal concern clause, it becomes apparent that there are many areas 
where both the municipalities and the State can exercise legitimate 
control. One check upon local power is the doctrine of pre-emption. 
As with the municipal concern requirement, the pre-emption doc-
trine has its basis in the home-rule provision of the Michigan constitu-
tion.86 Since the home-rule powers are subject to the constitution and 
general laws of the State, the courts have held that when the state 
legislature has intended to pre-empt the field in a given area, any 
local attempts at additional regulation in that area are void. When 
the legislature has manifested the necessary intent, pre-emption oc-
curs regardless of whether the local ordinance complements or is 
contradictory to the statute. 
In Michigan, the determination of legislative intent is of necessity 
34. See notes 78-79 &: 102-03 infra and accompanying text. 
35. See, e.g., Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W .2d 318 (1971). 
86. Mica. CoNsr. art. 7, § 22, set out in text accompanying note l!l supra. 
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made without the benefit of any recorded legislative history, and 
proceeds essentially on the basis of other guides to statutory inter-
pretation. Thus, the nature and extent of the inquiry pursued by the 
courts in determining the legislative intent has varied considerably. 
In Walsh v. City of River Rouge,81 the Michigan supreme court en-
gaged in a thorough analysis of the state legislation. Walsh involved 
a Michigan statute granting emergency powers to the Governor, and 
a city ordinance granting similar powers to the mayor. Since the 
statute itself provided for discretionary grants of emergency power 
by the Governor to mayors, the court reasoned that the legislature 
intended that such powers be withheld from mayors absent a specific 
gubernatorial delegation thereof. Consequently, the statute was con-
sidered to embody a "legislative intent to lodge exclusive powers in 
the Governor, thereby pre-empting the field from local govem-
ments,"38 thus rendering the ordinance void. 
In Richards v. City of Pontiac,89 the Michigan supreme court also 
found a state statute to be pre-emptive, but did so without the benefit 
of the forceful reasoning found in Walsh. The Richards court con-
sidered whether the Michigan legislature, in passing a trailer park 
act, had intended to pre-empt the field, rendering ultra vires a munic-
ipal attempt at additional control. The court described the provisions 
of the act, and, citing nothing more than the comprehensive nature 
of the statute and its general application throughout the State to cities 
as well as rural areas, stated in conclusory fashion that its "intent and 
purpose is to take over the entire field of regulation and supervision 
of trailer parks in the State."40 The reasoning of the court is not 
entirely persuasive, for the factors cited by the court do not compel 
the conclusion that the legislature intended to occupy the field and 
preclude concurrent municipal regulation. 
In other cases the Michigan courts have attached considerable 
significance to the presence or absence of express language reserving 
exclusive control in the legislature. In Noey v. City of Saginaw,41 a 
city ordinance placed more restrictive closing hours on taverns than 
those provided for by statute. The Michigan supreme court held the 
ordinance void, noting that the State reserved, by legislative provi-
sion, " 'the sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic bev-
erage traffic .•. within the State.' "42 
The court mentioned the absence of such an express statement of 
37. 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971). 
38. 385 Mich. at 635, 189 N.W.2d at 324. 
39. 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W .2d 885 (1943). 
40. 305 Mich. at 672, 9 N.W.2d at 888. 
41. 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935). 
42. 271 Mich. at 598, 261 N.W. at 89, quoting what is now MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. 
§ 436.l (1967). 
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legislative pre-emptive intent in upholding a city ordinance in Miller 
v. Fabius Township Board.43 A city ordinance there imposed more 
restrictive hours on water skiing than those imposed by the state 
power-boating statute. Without any extensive analysis of the statute, 
the court found that the legislature "certainly" did not intend to 
pre-empt the field, and, furthermore, had they so intended, the 
legislature "could have expressly stated pre-emptive control."44 It 
may be suggested that the absence of express language establishing 
pre-emptive intent was not the sole controlling factor in Miller, since 
the court on other occasions has declined to find significance in such 
a legislative omission.40 The court's conclusion that the legislature 
did not intend pre-emption may have been influenced by its view 
that "the ordinance was enacted to prevent the many dangers and 
alleviate the congested local conditions that existed on Pleasant 
Lake."46 In this respect it is worth noting that the Michigan supreme 
court in Walsh expressly stated that the "legal question" of pre-emp-
tion would be resolved "against (the] background of competing pol-
icy considerations."41 Thus, this brief survey of Michigan case law 
demonstrates that in the absence of a readily discernible legislative 
intent the Michigan courts retain great flexibility in handling the 
pre-emption issue. 
Turning to a consideration of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordi-
nance, the question for determination is whether the Michigan legis-
lature intended to pre-empt the field of marijuana control by passage 
of the Controlled Substances Act of 1971.48 Certain factors do mili-
tate toward a finding of pre-emptive intent. First, the Act is very 
comprehensive in scope-marijuana is only one of many drugs reg-
ulated by the statute-and this factor was deemed relevant in Rich-
ards. Second, the argument that the State has an interest in the 
uniform application of its drug laws might suggest a presumption 
that the legislature intended exclusively to control marijuana-related 
activities. 
While these considerations have merit, a reading of the Act and 
other factors indicate an absence of legislative pre-emptive intent. 
First, there is no provision in the Controlled Substances Act reserv-
ing exclusive control in the "administrator" of the Act.49 In a rather 
43. 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962). 
44. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208. 
45. See, e.g., Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W .2d 318 (1971); 
Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W .2d 885 (1943). 
46. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208. 
47. 385 Mich. at 634-35, 189 N.W.2d at 324. 
48. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.301-.367 (Supp. 1972). 
49. " 'Administrator' means the state board of pharmacy or its designated or estab-
lished authority." Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 335.303(2) (Supp. 1972). The Act does vest 
discretion in the administrator to reclassify or delete controlled substances from the 
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analogous type of legislation, the Michigan Liquor Control Act of 
1933, 110 the legislature provided for the creation of the liquor control 
commission,111 and provided also that "the commission shall have the 
sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic beverage traffic 
• . . within the state of Michigan.''112 The omission of such a clause 
from the Controlled Substances Act may suggest the absence of a 
legislative intent to pre-empt concurrent local regulation,113 as the 
Michigan supreme court noted in Miller. Second, section 44 of the 
Controlled Substances Act provides: "Any penalty imposed for viola-
tion of this act is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or ad-
ministrative penalty or sanction otherwise authorized by law.''114 
While this provision was presumably not drafted in contemplation 
of concurrent munipical control, it nonetheless makes clear that the 
Act does not contemplate pre-emption of all additional regulation 
and penalties.1111 
The brief survey and analysis of Michigan cases such as Walsh 
and Miller establish the principle that absent clearer indications of 
legislative intention, policy considerations properly may be raised in 
support of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance in response to a pre-
emption challenge. This principle is not inconsistent with the fact 
that legislative intent is the touchstone of pre-emption. The Michi-
proscriptions of the Act on the basis of such factors as the state of the scientific 
knowledge, patterns of abuse, and risk to the public health. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 335.311 (Supp. 1972). Such a broad grant of discretionary power might evidence a 
legislative intention of providing sufficient flexibility to obviate the necessity of local 
regulation. 
50. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 436.1-.58 (1967). The two laws are parallel in many 
respects. Both the Controlled Substances Act and the Liquor Control Act regulate and 
control the availability of substances which are prone to abuse and which possess 
habit forming characteristics. Both Acts provide for licensing distributors {MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.332 (Supp. 1972), 436.17-.28 (1967)), regulation of labeling 
(MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 335.331 (Supp. 1972), 436.46-.46a (1967)), revocation of 
licenses (MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 335.334 (Supp. 1972), 436.20-.21, 436.51 (1967)), and 
for programs to combat abuse of the substances (MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. §§ 335.358 
(Supp. 1972), 436.47a (1967)). 
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.5 (1967). 
52. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 436.1 (1967). 
53. The Michigan Legislature is not hesitant to include pre-emptive clauses in 
legislation. The Liquor Control Act is but one example. The uniformity provision 
of the state motor vehicle code, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 257.605 (1967), reads: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local 
authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter. 
This clause does permit concurrent regulation but requires that it be strictly uniform, 
and it is pre-emptive of divergent local law. 
54. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.344 (Supp. 1972). 
55. On the other hand, the specific mention of civil and administrative proceedings 
coupled with the omission of any reference to criminal proceedings might be read as 
evidence of an intention to pre-empt the field of criminal regulation of controlled 
substances. 
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gan legislature, particularly in light of the recent enactment in 1971 
of the Controlled Substances Act, must have been aware of the 
competing policies that were outlined above in the discussion of 
municipal concemli6 and surely acted to promote what was deemed, 
on balance, sound policy. 
It was suggested above that the municipality's interest in encour-
aging respect for the law and its processes, in providing responsive 
and efficient local government, and in maintaining a healthy level 
of autonomy outweigh the State's interest in uniform control of 
marijuana-related activities. What a court would view as the prob-
able legislative judgment in balancing these factors may affect the 
determination of the pre-emption issue. Significantly, to the extent 
that municipal ordinances benefit from a presumption of constitu-
tionality,57 a court should require substantial evidence that estab-
lishes pre-emptive legislative intent to void the Ann Arbor mari-
juana ordinance. 
In areas not pre-empted by the State, "the 'rule' has long been rec-
ognized that municipalities are not divested of all control even where 
the legislature has enacted laws."58 I£ the Controlled Substances Act 
was not intended to be pre-emptive, the Ann Arbor marijuana ordi-
nance would be allowed to stand unless the provisions of the or-
dinance are in conflict with those of the statute.59 The conflict prin-
ciple is again based upon the constitutional home-rule provision, 
specifically the limiting phrase "subject to the constitution and 
law."60 The words "subject to" have consistently been given the 
judicial construction of "not in conflict with,"61 and the general 
rule succinctly states that "if a city ordinance prohibits something 
which a State statute permits, or vice versa, there is a conflict and 
the State law must prevail."62 The "vice versa" suggests, of course, 
the existence of a conflict when a city ordinance permits conduct 
56. See notes 26-35 supra and accompanying text. 
57. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
58. Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd., 366 Mich. 250, 257, 114 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1962). 
59. It should be noted that the courts have not always drawn bright lines between 
their analytical treatment of the conflict and pre-emption issues, See, e.g., Noey v. 
City of Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935). In Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd., 366 
Mich. 250, 258, 114 N.W.2d 205, 208-09 (1962), however, the court expressly engaged in 
a two-step process, reaching the conflict issue only after deciding that the ordinance 
was not pre-empted by the statute, 
60. MICH. CONST. art, 7, § 22, set out in text accompanying note 13 supra. 
61. See, e.g., People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W .2d 681 (1954); Conroy v. 
City of Battle Creek, 314 Mich. 210, 22 N.W.2d 275 (1946); People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 
305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Noey v. City of Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935); 
People v. McGraw, 184 Mich. 233, 150 N.W. 836 (1915). 
62. Builder's Assn, v. City of Detroit, 295 Mich. 272, 277, 294 N.W. 677, 679 (1940). 
See also City of Grand Haven v. Grocer's Co-operative Dairy, 330 Mich. 694, 48 N.W.2d 
362 (1951); Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W,2d 885 (1943); National 
Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N.W. 342 (1935). 
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prohibited by statute. Traditional conflict issues come most clearly 
into focus when both a city and the State act to regulate the same 
realm of activity with laws containing similar, though not identical, 
prohibitive provisions. At what point does permissible concurrent 
regulation become unconstitutional conflict and contravention? The 
Michigan supreme court has noted that the question is "difficult 
of solution, and cannot be determined by any fixed rule. Each par-
ticular case must be determined as it arises."63 
This approach has hindered the development of any cohesive 
rubric, and analysis of the case law reveals a certain lack of harmony 
among the decisions. In People v. McDaniel,64 the Michigan supreme 
court considered a municipal ordinance that prohibited the use of 
motor boats having engines of greater than five horsepower on a local 
lake. The State of Michigan had also legislated to control power 
boating, and required, inter alia, that power boats be equipped with 
specified sound control devices. Although the court acknowledged 
the municipal concern in eliminating the excessive disturbance to 
lakeshore residents caused by the larger power boats, the court held 
that the ordinance did in fact prohibit that which the statute per-
mitted, and was consequently void. 
An ordinance alleged to be in conflict with an amendment to the 
same power-boating statute was the object of the court's attention 
in a more recent case, Miller v. Fabius Township Board.65 It was con-
tended that an ordinance prohibiting water skiing between the hours 
of four p.m. and ten a.m. was in conflict with a section of the statute 
that prohibited water skiing during the period one hour after sunset 
until one hour before sunrise. Under the reasoning of McDaniel it 
would indeed seem that the ordinance prohibited that which the 
statute permitted, thus rendering the ordinance void. The Michigan 
supreme court, however, found that since the statute was not in-
tended to be pre-emptive66 and the field was amenable to additional 
regulation by the municipality, the town could properly prohibit that 
which the statute did not expressly permit.67 This appears to be a 
more liberal view of the scope of permissible municipal authority 
than that envisioned in People v. McDaniel, which was cited by the 
dissent but ignored by the majority in Miller. Although McDaniel 
was not expressly overruled in Miller, the two cases are not easily 
reconciled. Miller may therefore suggest an increasing judicial sensi-
tivity to the special concerns of municipalities. 
63. National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 616, 259 N.W. 342, 343 
(1935). 
64. 303 Mich. 90, 5 N.W.2d 667 (1942). 
65. 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962). 
66. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra. 
67. 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d at 208-09. 
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While Miller and McDaniel treat the conflict issue as it relates to 
conflicting substantive provisions, it should be noted that in the case 
of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance, the question of conflict, if 
any, is more subtle. Since both the statute and ordinance provide 
some sanction for essentially similar conduct, it would not appear 
that a conflict arises within the literal terms of the general rule: The 
ordinance, while providing a different and lesser penalty, does not 
literally permit what the statute prohibits. On the other hand, it is 
arguable that the significantly lesser penalty of the ordinance con-
flicts with the legislative policy of the statute by implicitly con-
doning conduct which is prohibited by the statute and thereby un-
dermining the statute's deterrent effect.68 This conflict of policy, 
however, may be more appropriately dealt with under the municipal 
concern balancing approach or under the pre-emption doctrine. 
It is significant that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance makes 
punishable as a misdemeanor certain offenses that are considered 
felonies under the statute. For example, selling or giving away mari-
juana is a misdemeanor under the ordinance, while "delivery" is a 
felony under the statute.69 In some jurisdictions changing the classifi-
cation of an offense from a felony to a misdemeanor might be con-
clusive evidence of a conflict.70 Michigan does not adhere to this rule. 
Michigan courts have held that "a felony in this State is distinguish-
able from a misdemeanor as a grade of crime only by reason of the 
place and severity of punishment."71 It could be argued that even 
this variation in degree creates a conflict sufficient to invalidate the 
ordinance. However, the Michigan supreme court's treatment of a 
case similar to that presented by the concurrent regulation of mari-
juana indicates that at least in certain instances an ordinance will 
be upheld despite the fact that it provides lesser penalties for con-
duct than the applicable state law. 
The early case of People v. Hanrahan72 dealt with concurrent 
regulation of prostitution by the City of Detroit and the State. Sig-
nificantly, Hanrahan upheld a city ordinance that made punishable 
as a misdemeanor an offense that the State made punishable as a 
felony. The defendant was convicted under a city ordinance that 
prohibited keeping a house of ill fame, and that provided for a fine 
68. See Note, supra note 4, at 748. 
69. See notes 1-2 supra. While MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 335.341 (Supp. 1972) makes 
delivery a felony, § 335.46(2) provides that noncommercial distribution without re-
muneration and not to further a commercial purpose is only a misdemeanor. 
70. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Coy, 182 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Han-
bury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 122 S.E.2d 911 (1961); City of Fort Worth v. 
MacDonald, 293 S.W .2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
71. People v. Beasley, 370 Mich. 242, 246, 121 N.W.2d 457, 459 (1963) (emphasis 
added). 
72. 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889). 
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not to exceed 500 dollars, or imprisonment for up to six months or 
until such fine was paid. A statute barring similar and related con-
duct provided for a fine not to exceed 1,000 dollars or imprisonment 
for not more than five years, or both. In affirming the validity of the 
ordinance, the Michigan supreme court addressed itself to arguments 
relevant to the instant problem of marijuana control. The court 
first noted the argument for statewide uniformity of the criminal 
laws 
that it is the province of the legislature to declare what shall consti-
tute crime, and to prescribe punishment therefore; that an offense 
against the criminal laws of the State is the same offense in whatever 
locality it is committed, and should subject the offender to the same 
punishment. 73 
The court rejected this argument, finding such contentions "not 
fundamental,"74 and noting that the legislature might make certain 
acts criminal and punishable as felonies in some parts of the State 
while those same acts, if done in different sections of the State, would 
not be criminal at all.75 The court expressed no dismay that munic-
ipalities could achieve the same result through the delegated law-
making powers. 
A second argument confronted by the court raised the prospect 
that this authority for local control, "carried to its logical results, 
would authorize each township in the State, and each county to have 
its own code of criminal laws, differing from the others."76 The court 
responded to this approach by reasoning that although the legisla-
ture has the responsibility to determine what shall constitute a crime 
and how it shall be punished, a portion of this responsibility and 
authority was necessarily delegated to municipalities in order that 
they might implement their mandate to protect the health, morals, 
welfare, and good order of their communities.77 The court conceded 
73. 75 Mich. at 617, 42 N.W. at 1126. 
74. 75 Mich. at 617, 42 N.W. at 1126. 
75. 75 Mich. at 617-18, 42 N.W. at 1126. 
76. 75 Mich. at 618, 42 N.W. at 1126. 
77. 75 Mich. at 618, 42 N.W. at 1127. See also Feek v. Township Bd., 82 Mich. 393, 
411-12, 47 N.W. 37, 40 (1890): 
[E]specially is it true where the constitution authorizes a delegation of legislative 
power for local purposes-the legislature may suspend, or authorize legislation 
which will necessarily operate to suspend, the general law in particular localities. 
The principle is a recognition of the right of local self-government. One locality 
may feel the need of different local regulations from another. The wants of a 
ma1ority of its electors are respected in granting to the local municipality the 
power to enact such laws relating to their internal affairs as the feelings and 
wishes of the majority demand. 
Feek, like Hanrahan, antedates the passage of the Home-Rule Act, yet its language 
concerning "delegation of legislative power for local purposes" becomes more sig-
nificant in light of the subsequent enactment. The local police powers noted in Han-
rahan, which gained statutory support in the Home-Rule Act (see notes 15-19 supra 
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the possibility of internecine strife and bitterness caused by arbitrary 
and inconsistent criminal laws in neighboring communities, but 
denied that any real likelihood of such a situation was present. The 
court also reasoned that 
[if such abuse of the local power] should be attempted, and result in 
wrong or oppression to the people, the remedy is in their hands. The 
legislators are chosen by them, and it is in their power to effect any 
needed reform.1s 
The Hanrahan case is not without weaknesses as precedent for 
similar resolution of a "conflict" problem in the home-rule context. 
Hanrahan was decided in 1889, well before the 1908 passage of the 
Michigan Home-Rule Act. The special charter passed by the legis-
lature for the City of Detroit specifically authorized the City to act 
to " 'prohibit, prevent, and suppress the keeping and leasing of houses 
of ill fame.' "79 The general conflicts rule that the city cannot permit 
what the statute prohibits is applicable "in the absence of specific 
statutory or charter power in the municipality.''8° Certainly Hanra-
han could be distinguished on this ground. Nevertheless, the ra-
tionale underlying the court's holding seems to be based upon the 
general authority that the legislature delegated to municipalities to 
act in protection of the public order, health and welfare; the very 
same authority that was later embodied in the Home-Rule Act. The 
Michigan court has not felt constrained to limit the principles of 
Hanrahan to ordinances suppressing prostitution, but rather has 
recognized the breadth of its holding by citing it in support of local 
control in diverse areas.81 The reasoning in Hanrahan supports later 
Michigan decisions that deal with the scope of municipal control 
after the passage of the Home-Rule Act: 
The [Home-Rule Act] was passed in obedience to a mandate of ... the 
Constitution .... The new system is one of general grant of rights 
and powers, subject only to certain enumerated restrictions, instead 
of the former method of only granting enumerated rights and powers 
definitely specified.s2 
and accompanying text), would be ineffective without the concomitant power to enact 
ordinances for their enforcement. 
78. 75 Mich. at 619, 42 N.W. at 1127. 
79. 75 Mich. at 614, 42 N.W. at 1125 quoting Local Acts of 1883, ch. 7, § 47, at 611. 
80. National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 616, 259 N.W. 342, 343 
(1935). 
81. People v. Drost, 353 Mich. 691, 91 N.W.2d 851 (1958) (regulation of traffic 
offenses); Eanes v. City of Detroit, 279 Mich. 531, 272 N.W. 896 (1937) (regulation of 
barber shops); Brennan v. Recorder of the City of Detroit, 207 Mich. 35, 173 N.W. 
511 (1919) (control of city streets); City of Alma v. Clow, 146 Mich. 443, 109 N.W. 853 
(1906) (licensing of hawkers and peddlars); People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 
Mich. 471, 46 N.W. 735 (1890) (public nuisance); Feek v. Township Bd., 82 Mich. 
393, 47 N.W. 37 (1890) (liquor laws). 
82. Gallup v. City of Saginaw, 170 Mich. 195, 199-200, 135 N.W. 1060, 1062 (1912). 
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The general grant of powers described in this passage suggests the 
same need for latitude in local action that Hanrahan endorses. 
To the extent that Hanrahan remains viable, it suggests that a 
reduction in the class of offense from felony to misdemeanor does 
not create a fatal conflict. The social and political policies that under-
lie Michigan's determination to allow home-rule cities wide latitude 
in the control of their affairs are no less persuasive when the city 
makes a state felony punishable as a misdemeanor. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance does not create 
a constitutionally significant conflict with the Controlled Substances 
Act. 
Given the present concurrent city and state regulation of mari-
juana-related offenses, the question remains whether impermissible 
discretion is vested in the Ann Arbor City Attorney. The City of 
Ann Arbor is without power to pre-empt or suspend the operation 
of the state law within her city limits. Thus, the Ann Arbor City 
Attorney recognizes the continuing validity of the statute in Ann 
Arbor, and may refer marijuana offenders to the Washtenaw County 
Prosecutor for disposition under the state law. While the city At-
torney's Office has declined to specify the criteria for such a deci-
sion, stating that the problem is dealt with on a case-by-case basis, it 
has been indicated that the quantity of marijuana involved is one 
relevant factor.83 Significantly, the previous Ann Arbor marijuana 
ordinance, which was superseded by the present ordinance, pro-
vided that "it shall be a violation of this code to give away or sell 
marijuana or cannabis, as so defined, not for profit and not as part 
of a commercial distribution."84 Although this distinction was not 
included in the present ordinance, the mayor's oflice85 has indicated 
that it was the Council's understanding in passing the present law, 
that the commercial or noncommercial nature of the offense be con-
sidered before deciding whether or not to defer to county prosecu-
tion. 
The present procedure may be simply described: Enforcement 
See People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 312-13, 17 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1945): 
A reading of the home-rule act shows that it is rather comprehensive in its provi-
sions as to what the city may or may not incorporate in its charter, but it leaves 
many things to be implied from the power conferred. • • • The purpose of the 
legislative enactment was to give the city a large measure of home rule •••• Con-
sidering its purpose, it should be construed liberally and in a home rule spirit. 
See also Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip, 258 Mich. 144, 148, 241 N.W. 893, 894 (1932): 
"The provision for a general law for their incorporation was intended to confer upon 
them almost exclusive rights in the control of their affairs, not in conflict with the Con-
stitution or general laws applicable thereto. 
83. Interview with Jerold Lax, Ann Arbor City Attorney. See note 108 infra. 
84. Ord. 4-71, adopted March 8, 1971, as amended, ANN AruloR, MicH., CITY CoDE, 
tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9:62(29) (1972). 
85. Interview with Robert J. Harris, Mayor of Ann Arbor. 
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within the city limits is handled almost exclusively by the Ann Arbor 
Police Department.86 When the infrequent arrest is made by the 
Washtenaw County Sheriff's Department or by the State Police, the 
person arrested is invariably turned over to the Prosecutor's Office 
for prosecution under the statute,87 for the Sheriff's Department and 
the State Police have no mandate to enforce city law. After an arrest 
has been made by the Ann Arbor Police for a marijuana offense, the 
case is given to the City Attorney, who decides whether to prosecute 
under the ordinance or to transfer the case to the County Prose-
cutor. 88 Although city police can bring persons under their arrest to 
the Prosecutor for authorization to prosecute, they uniformly bring 
marijuana cases to the City Attorney, in accordance with an estab-
lished, though unwritten, department procedure. 89 Thus, in practice 
the discretion rests with the City Attorney, and not with the arrest-
ing officers. 
It is common for a prosecuting officer to be faced with different 
statutes or ordinances under which he could prosecute a given case, 
and the law recognizes the propriety of such prosecutorial discretion. 
As Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger observed in his concurring 
opinion in Hutcherson v. United States: 90 
The functions of a prosecutor afford examples of a wide variety of 
powers to "select" the punishment in the sense argued by appellant, 
and to select the forum. One is seen in the situation where the prose-
cutor in one jurisdiction elects to yield prosecution of an accused for 
an offense to a jurisdiction which has capital punishment not avail-
able in the waiving jurisdiction. Similarly a prosecutor may elect to 
prosecute or not to prosecute, or to indict for greater rather than lesser 
included offenses on facts which reasonably support either.91 
86. Since the ordinance has been in effect, there has been one arrest by authorities 
other than the Ann Arbor Police. In that case a city resident called ,the State Police to 
report that his neighbor was cultivating marijuana. The State Police responded and 
made an arrest. Interview with Washtenaw County Prosecutor's Office. 
87. Lax Interview, supra note 8!1. 
88. Id. 
89. Interview with Harold Olson, Ann Arbor Deputy Chief of Police. 
90. 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
91. 345 F.2d at 970 n.5. Judge Burger continued: "The record before us shows that 
the Attorney General has promulgated standards for the guidance of United States Attor• 
neys in the exercise of their discretion in narcotics prosecutions." Judge Bazelon (con• 
curring in part and dissenting in part) quoted the following portion of sections 86.2-.!l of 
the United States Attorney's Manual: 
"The principal object of enforcement is ••• to prosecute the importers, dealers and 
traffickers •••. The emphasis should be on prosecutions of the sellers or purveyors, 
particularly those who deal with minors, and not the mere addict possessors •••• 
[C]riminal prosecutions of [addicts] in some instances may be justified so as to 
compel an addict to undergo complete [rehabilitative] treatment. • • • [P]rosecu-
tions for such minor offenses which are considered to be local in character may 
well be and often are left to the state or local authorities. Not falling within such 
minor category are cases against persons, whether addicts or not, who engage in 
the importation or transportation or are in possession of these drugs under cir-
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The decision that confronts the Ann Arbor City Attorney under the 
dual prohibitions of the statute and the ordinance is analogous to 
that faced by the prosecutor who waives jurisdiction to a state that 
has capital punishment. 
Michigan law shares the acceptance of this discretion vested in 
the prosecutor's office. In Murphy v. Weideman92 a defendant was 
first charged with driving without an operator's license in his pos-
session, in violation of a local ordinance. The charge was dismissed 
by the judge, and a complaint was issued under a state statute that 
prohibited essentially the same conduct. Defendant, convicted under 
the statute, then contended on appeal that he should have been tried 
under the ordinance. The court found the contention to be without 
merit, noting that the defendant "had no vested right to be tried 
under the ordinance," since "[t]he prosecution might have been 
brought in the first instance under the statute .... "93 
A different situation was presented in People v. Lombardo,94 
where the defendant was prosecuted under a statutory felony, aiding 
and abetting the keeping of a house of prostitution, rather than 
under a misdemeanor statute that prohibited admitting any person 
into a building for the purpose of prostitution. Whereas the alterna-
tive laws in Murphy proscribed the same conduct, the two statutes 
in Lombardo proscribed different conduct. The Lombardo court 
reached a similar result, however, holding that "[p ]rosecuting offi-
cers have the right to use their discretion in determining under 
which of applicable statutes a prosecution shall be instituted."95 Al-
though the result in Murphy is inconsistent with a requirement that 
the two laws available to a prosecutor must contain different sub-
cumstances reasonably indicating that the drugs were intended for use in the illegal 
traffic." 
345 F.2d at 975. 
The standards that justified the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Hutcherson are 
similar to those employed by the Ann Arbor City Attorney. Both consider the quantity 
of drugs involved, and the commercial or noncommercial nature of the offense. Neither 
office has seen fit to specify quantitative criteria upon which discretion is exercised. 
Significantly, discretion is justified in Hutcherson even though such discretion came 
very close to a sentencing type decision. By electing to proceed under one statute, the 
prosecutor in Hutcherson subjected the defendant to a more severe minimum sentence. 
This would not normally be the case with the discretion exercised by Ann Arbor's City 
Attorney, since the Controlled Substances Act provides no minimum sentences for first 
offenders. With multiple offenders, however, the situation would more closely parallel 
that of the Hutcherson case. The court has discretion to place a first offender on pro-
bation and may discharge such a person without an adjudication of guilt if he fulfills 
the conditions of his probation but may not do so with a person who has been pre-
viously convicted under the Act or under any federal or state law relating to narcotic 
drugs. MICH, COMP, LAws ANN. § 335.347(1) (Supp. 1972). 
92. 340 Mich. 193, 65 N.W.2d 320 (1954) (The case appears under the title Recorder'& 
Court Presiding Judge v. Third Judicial Circuit Judge in Michigan Reports.) 
93. 340 Mich. at 199, 65 N.W .2d at 322. 
94. 301 Mich. 451, 3 N.W.2d 839 (1942). 
95. Mich. at 453, 3 N.W .2d at 839. 
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stantive elements to justify the use of discretion, and the Lombardo 
court does not expressly mention this as a basis for its holding,06 
there are Michigan cases suggesting that the discretion is improper 
if the prosecutor can choose between laws with identical substantive 
provisions and varying penalties.07 
For example, in People v. Ryan,98 the defendant was convicted 
of a felony, voluntarily driving away the motor vehicle of another. 
The defendant contended on appeal that another statute made 
identical conduct a misdemeanor, and that the asserted difference in 
punishment for the same crime rendered the discretion vested in the 
prosecutor an unconstitutional delegation of authority to a nonjudi-
cial officer. Significantly, the felony statute required the element of 
scienter, which was expressly discarded in the misdemeanor statute.00 
The court upheld the conviction, stating: "Since there is a distinc-
tion between the aforementioned statutes, it follows that the prose-
cutor had a right to use discretion in determining under which of 
applicable statutes a prosecution shall be instituted."100 Thus, in 
Ryan the prosecutor's discretion is grounded upon the distinct ele-
ments of the available charges, whereas in Murphy it is not. This 
renders uncertain the presence of constitutional due process or equal 
protection when the prosecutor exercises discretion in charging 
either of two offenses with identical substantive elements but differ-
ing penalties.101 
It is essential that the Ann Arbor City Attorney be vested with 
discretion to prosecute under the ordinance or to turn the case over 
to the County Prosecutor if a flexible system responsive to the dy-
namics of the individual cases is to develop. The Ann Arbor City 
96. See also People v. Jackson, 29 Mich. App. 654, 185 N.W.2d 608 (1971). 
97. People v. Mire, 173 Mich. 357, 138 N.W. 1066 (1912); People v. Graves, 31 Mich. 
App. 635, 188 N.W.2d 87 (1971); People v. Ryan, 11 Mich. App. 559, 161 N.W .2d 754 
(1968). 
98. 11 Mich. App. 559, 161 N.W .2d 754 (1968). 
99. Compare MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.413 (1967) (the felony statute) with 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.414 (1967) (the misdemeanor statute). 
100. 11 Mich. App. at 561, 161 N.W .2d at 755-56. 
101. This uncertainty is not limited to Michigan case law. A majority of the United 
States Supreme Court declined to reach this issue in Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 
(1955), although it was considered by Justice Black in a vigorous dissent, 351 U.S. 
at 139-40: 
[T]wo statutes proscribe identical conduct and no "different .proof" was required to 
convict petitioner of the felony than would have been reqmred to convict him of 
the misdemeanor •••• 
A basic principle of our criminal law is that the Government only prosecutes 
people for crimes under statutes passed by Congress which fairly and clearly de-
fine the conduct made criminal and the punishment which can be administered. 
This basic principle is fl.outed if either of these statutes can be selected as the 
controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General 
• • 
0.A congressional delegation of such vast power would raise serious constitutional 
questions. 
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Attorney, in deciding whether to prosecute a marijuana violator 
under the ordinance, or to tum the case over to the County Prose-
cutor for disposition under the statute, may or may not be presented 
with the availability of identical provisions depending upon the 
offense charged. Both the ordinance and the statute proscribe the 
"use" of marijuana. However, other provisions of the t\\TO laws con-
tain different elements. For example, the ordinance states that no 
person shall "give away or sell"102 marijuana, whereas the statute 
prohibits "delivery"103 and "distribut[ion] ... without remuneration 
and not to further commercial distribution."104 Prosecution may be 
brought under the statute for constructive delivery,105 whereas a 
constructive sale or gift is not expressly prohibited by the ordinance. 
This distinction could justify a decision by the prosecuting officer 
to let the case proceed under the statute, since this course could in-
crease the likelihood of success in cases involving the more complex 
forms of delivery. There is another variation: whereas the mari-
juana ordinance prohibits simple possession, the statute makes it un-
lawful for one "knowingly or intentionally"106 to possess a controlled 
substance. The statutory element of scienter, absent from the 
ordinance, might distinguish the two offenses and thereby justify 
prosecutorial discretion even under the Ryan requirement of differ-
ent elements in the available charges. Significantly, it is in the "use" 
cases that the t\\To laws are most similar. Therefore, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in a "use" case would be most susceptible 
to attack under the Ryan standard. Yet, in such cases the City At-
torney, under the criteria noted above, 107 has the least margin for 
discretion: The simple "use" cases are those which are most likely to 
be dealt with under the ordinance, since they would typically involve 
an insignificant amount of marijuana in a noncommercial setting.108 
The discussion of the differing elements of the municipal and 
statutory marijuana offenses also pertains to the issue of double 
jeopardy. Specifically, if a person is convicted or acquitted of a mari-
juana offense under the Ann Arbor ordiJ1ance, can he then be prose-
cuted for the same criminal behavior under the Controlled Sub-
102. ANN .AruloR, MICH., CITY CODE, tit. IX, ch. 108, § 9.62(29) (1972), set out in note 
l supra. 
103. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.341(1) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra. 
104. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 335.346(2) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra. 
105. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 335.304(1) (Supp. 1972): "'Deliver' or 'delivery' means 
the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from 1 person to another of a controlled 
substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship." 
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 335.341(4) (Supp. 1972), set out in note 2 supra. 
107. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra. 
108. Since the present Ann Arbor ordinance has been in effect, the City Attorney has 
prosecuted the vast majority of marijuana offenses under the ordinance. Only a few 
cases, all of which involved substantial quantities of marijuana, have been shifted to 
the Prosecutor's Office. Lax Interview, supra note 83. 
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stances Act? To prevent the State from defeating the City's purpose of 
lenient treatment of marijuana offenders, it is necessary that jeopardy 
attach to the municipal trial barring subsequent state prosecution. 
The Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy provision 
of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution is applicable 
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.109 The Court re-
cently took the opportunity to consider the double jeopardy problem 
as it relates to successive prosecutions by a city and a state for the 
same offense. In Waller v. Florida,11° a mural was stolen from a 
municipal building. The mural was subsequently recovered in a 
damaged condition by the police. The defendant was convicted of 
destruction of government property under a local ordinance. After 
serving his sentence, the defendant was then charged with and 
convicted of grand larceny under a statute. The district court of 
appeal upheld the conviction, disposing of the defendant's double 
jeopardy argument by invoking the dual sovereign doctrine.m This 
doctrine rests upon an analogy between the city-state relationship 
and that of a state and the federal government: Since an offense can 
simultaneously violate the laws of both sovereigns, both are entitled 
to prosecute the violator. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme 
Court stressed that cities are creations of the state, and derive their 
municipal powers and authority therefrom.112 They are essentially 
subdivisions of a sovereign state, and lack the independent source 
of power associated with sovereigns. Thus, the Court held that 
[t]he Florida courts were in error to the extent of holding that 
"even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical 
offense with which he is charged in a state court, this would not be 
a bar to the prosecution of such person in the proper state court."113 
Waller changed the law in many jurisdictions,114 but it merely 
served to reinforce what had long been the law in Michigan.115 
Although Waller holds that a city and state cannot both prose-
cute a defendant for the same offense, it leaves unanswered the 
critical question of what constitutes the "same" offense. Michigan 
109. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
110. 397 U.S. 387 (1969). 
111. Waller v. State, 213 S.2d 623 (1968). 
112. 397 U.S. at 392-93. 
113. 397 U.S. at 395, quoting 213 S.2d at 624. 
114. Decisions of the states that appeared to treat municipalities and the state as 
separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes at the time of Waller are listed by 
the Court, 397 U.S. at 391-92 n.3. 
115. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 627-28, 42 N.W. 1124, 1130 (1889): 
[Where there is concurrent regulation by city and state] prosecutions may be insti-
tuted under either law, and the court that first acquires jurisdiction over the per-
son of the accused has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine the case; 
and a conviction for an offense which is the same in both laws will be a bar to a 
prosecution for the same offense under the other law. 
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courts have traditionally responded to this question by application 
of the "same evidence test."116 In Michigan this test is applied "to 
ascertain whether the facts alleged in the second indictment would, 
if given in evidence, have warranted a conviction on the fi.rst."117 
Application of this test to successive prosecutions by City and State 
of marijuana offenses should be rather facile, and should lead to 
predictable results. Successive prosecutions under the "use" pro-
visions of both laws would clearly be for the same offense, and would 
constitute double jeopardy. A city conviction or acquittal for 
"possession" should bar a later state prosecution for knowing or 
intentional possession, since the evidence necessary to prove the 
latter would warrant a conviction on the initial misdemeanor charge. 
Under this test, state charges of possession with intent to deliver, 
or of delivery itself would be barred by a prior municipal conviction 
or acquittal of simple possession. 
There is additional protection afforded by statute: 
If, upon the trial of any person for a misdemeanor, the facts given in 
evidence amount in law to a felony, he shall not by reason thereof, 
be entitled to an acquittal of such misdemeanor, and no person tried 
for such misdemeanor shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted 
' for felony on the same facts, unless the court before which the trial 
shall be had, shall discharge the jury from giving any verdict upon 
such trial, and shall direct such person to be indicted for felony.118 
Thus, for example, if a person is tried under the ordinance for 
violation of the possession provision and the facts given in evidence 
constitute delivery under the statute, such person cannot later be 
tried on those same facts for delivery, under the protection of both 
the statute and the "same evidence test." The statute is also protec-
tive in cases not covered by the Michigan "same evidence test." 
A person convicted of sale of marijuana under the ordinance might 
properly, per the "same evidence test," have then been charged 
under the Controlled Substances Act with possession with intent to 
deliver, a felony, since the facts necessary to prove possession with 
intent to deliver would not have warranted a conviction under the 
municipal "sale" provision. Since, however, in the municipal prose-
cution for sale, evidence sufficient to show possession with intent 
to deliver is likely to be presented at trial, later prosecution under 
the possession with intent to deliver provision would be barred by 
the statute.110 
ll6. People v. Beverly, 247 Mich. 353, 79 N.W .2d 913 (1929); People v. Cook, 236 
Mich. 333, 210 N.W. 296 (1926); People v. Compain, 38 Mich. App. 289, 196 N.W.2d 353 
(1972). 
ll7. People v. Cook, 236 Mich. 333, 335, 210 N.W. 296 (1926). 
ll8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.4 (1968). 
119. Cf. People v. Beasley, 370 Mich. 242, 121 N.W .2d 457 (1963). 
424 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:400 
Attempting to distinguish substantively the offenses charged is 
but one way of evading the double jeopardy protection. Another 
method is to demonstrate that the first proceeding was of such a 
nature that jeopardy did not attach. In cases of successive prose-
cutions by City and State, the State might claim that jeopardy did 
not attach to the municipal proceeding120 since the municipal 
defendant, under the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance, is subject 
only to a fine.121 If a defendant's protection against double jeopardy 
120. Indeed, it has long been argued in many jurisdictions (other than Michigan) 
that even those municipal offenses punishable by a jail term are merely civil or petty 
proceedings to which jeopardy does not attach. For a brief history of this theory, see 
Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 
ORE. L. REv. 281 (1964). This argument is losing favor, however: 
Where once successive prosecutions by city and state could be condoned because 
of the insignificance of municipal punishment, today that is no longer the case. 
Municipal prosecutions, exercising authority unparallelled at common law, meting 
out penalties comparable to those imposed by higher state authority, can be con-
sidered as nothing less than prosecutions by the state itself. 
Id. at 314. 
The view expressed in United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 
1958), revd. on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), that "the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy .•• is applicable to all proceedings, irrespective of 
whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the outcome may be deprivation 
of the liberty of the person" is more consonant with the policies underlying the double 
jeopardy clause. 
121. There is presently, however, some uncertainty on this point. A local judge 
recently declared the penalty provision of the Ann Arbor Marijuana Ordinance uncon-
stitutional. People v. Fuqua, No. CR-7595 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Sept. 28, 1972). The judge 
did not reach the critical issues of conflict, pre-emption, or municipal concern, but 
limited his ruling of unconstitutionality to the penalty provision. The thrust of the 
opinion is that the City has unconstitutionally infringed upon the court's discretion to 
impose sentences of up to 500 dollars and/or ninety days for violation of ordinances, 
in that the City has specified a five dollar fine as the only permissible penalty upon 
conviction under the marijuana ordinance. As authority for its finding the court cited 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 117.4(i) (1967), a section of the Home-Rule Act: 
Each city may in its charter provide: for the punishment of those who violate its 
laws or ordinances, but no punishment shall exceed a fine of $500 or imprisonment 
for 90 days, or both, in the discretion of the court. 
The court interpreted this statute to mean that the city exceeds its power, and in-
trudes into the judicial domain when it sets the penalty for violations of ordinances 
below the statutory maximum. The judge failed to distinguish all other Ann Arbor 
ordinances, none of which authorize a 500 dollar fine and/or a ninety day imprison-
ment (100 dollars and/or ninety days is the maximum provision in the Ann Arbor City 
Code). The judge has ruled, in effect, that all Ann Arbor ordinances are unconstitu-
tional, and, further, that if the City is to prohibit any activity (e.g., overtime parking) 
it must allow the local judiciary to impose punishment of up to 500 dollars and/or 
ninety days, in its discretion, for violations. 
It is noteworthy that this issue was not raised by either of the parties, and was de-
cided on the court's own motion. The judge also denied a city attorney the opportu-
nity to argue the motion on the merits, although argument was heard at a later date. 
The court's opinion will shortly be subjected to judicial review in the circuit court, on 
appeal by the City. 
If the district court finding is upheld, and the five dollar fine invalidated, the 
severability clause of the City Code would act to continue the vitality of the marijuana 
ordinance, and the general penalty provision of the Code (100 dollars and/or ninety 
days) would then apply to the ordinance, unless the general penalty provision of the 
entire code is held unconstitutional. The provisions of the ordinance would still differ 
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were limited to that provided by the United States Constitution, 
this argument might be successful. The provision of the fifth amend-
ment is that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb."122 The federal courts 
have never confronted the issue of whether jeopardy attaches to a 
proceeding wherein conviction is punishable only by a fine, and 
not by a jail sentence, and this remains an open question.123 Michi-
gan law, however, is more clearly protective in this situation. The 
double jeopardy clause of the Michigan constitution does not in-
clude the "life and limb" qualification,124 and Michigan case law 
supports the principle that jeopardy attaches to municipal trials 
regardless of the nature or the severity of the penalty sought to be 
imposed: "A person is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial in a 
court of justice charged with a violation of law.''1211 Municipal 
ordinances have been described as possessing the full force of law: 
An ordinance, validly enacted, prohibiting certain acts under fines, 
penalties, or imprisonment, is within the jurisdiction of the munic-
ipality enacting it, as much entitled to respectful obedience, and is 
as much the law of the land for that locality, as a law enacted by the 
Legislature.126 
It thus appears that regardless of whether violation of an ordinance 
is punishable by a jail term or by a fine only, prosecution under an 
ordinance is a bar to subsequent prosecution under a statute for the 
same offense. Thus, the argument that jeopardy does not attach to 
offenses punishable only by fine should not preclude jeopardy from 
attaching to offenses prosecuted under the Ann Arbor marijuana 
ordinance. 
While the matter is not free from doubt, the foregoing analysis 
has suggested that the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance may be 
supported as a valid exercise of municipal authority, even in the 
face of challenges of pre-emption and conflict. Through the co-
operative interaction of the municipal marijuana ordinance, the 
double jeopardy bar, and the City Attorney's discretion to transfer 
the most serious cases to the county for prosecution under the state 
from those of the Controlled Substances Act, and the issues discussed herein would still 
be relevant to the concurrent effect of the ordinance and the statute. 
122, U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). 
123, This issue has assumed greater significance since Waller applied double jeop-
ardy to municipal trials because it is far more likely that offenses punishable only by 
fine will be found in municipal ordinances rather than in the federal or state codes. 
The case law suggests that "life and limb" should be read broadly. See Ex parte Lange, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); United 
States v. Farewell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alas. 1948). 
124. MICH. CoNsr. art. 6, § l. 
125. People v. PoweIS, 272 Mich. 303, 307, 261 N.W. 543, 544 (1935). 
126. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 620, 42 N.W. 1124, 1127 (1889). 
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law, the City of Ann Arbor has effectively declared the following 
proposition: Marijuana-related offenses-which are punishable as 
felonies, with possible prison terms, or misdemeanors, with possible 
jail terms, under the state law-will in most instances be punishable 
only as misdemeanors subject to five dollar parking-ticket-like fines 
if committed within the city limits. If the ordinance is upheld in 
the courts, the broader implications of the power that Ann Arbor 
has asserted will surely prove significant. 
A broad construction of the home-rule powers coupled with the 
application of the pre-emption and conflict doctrines only when 
municipalities act in contravention of a readily discernible state 
legislative intent would contribute a desirable, if not necessary, 
element of flexibility to the efficient administration of government 
in Michigan, a state with a broad rural constituency but with 
pockets of urbanization such as Detroit, Lansing, Ann Arbor, Flint, 
and Pontiac. Urban populations deal with different problems, are 
influenced by different values, and envision different priorities than 
their rural counterparts. One system of state law cannot always 
reflect or serve best the interests of both, and when such discrep-
ancies exist it seems appropriate for local legislation to supplement 
state law.127 
It is clear, however, that the obvious benefits to be derived from 
flexibility are gained only at the expense of some uniformity in 
statewide law enforcement. While there would remain a uniform 
application of the state law in every county of the State, the con-
junctive operation of enforcement of a differing local ordinance 
and resultant double jeopardy bar would detract from the uniform 
enforcement of state law. As in the case of marijuana-related offenses, 
certain locally held values might lead to disrespect for the law and 
its processes were any number of the State's criminal prohibitions 
to be enforced strictly;128 and argument can also be made that the 
127. A divergent local ordinance such as the one in question may help prompt the 
passage of similar state legislation. Progressive local communities, if given the freedom, 
can serve the function of Brandeis' famous laboratory experimenting with various 
socially progressive ideals of law and government, See New State Ice Co. v. Lieb• 
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). If such experiments prove 
successful, the legislature might adopt laws making such ideals the state policy. The 
impact of local legislation was noted by Governer Milliken in his Special Message to 
the Legislature on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, March 4, 1971: 
As public officials we must face squarely the need for a major revision of our laws 
dealing with marijuana. The hypocrisy of our present law, which falsely classifies 
marijuana as a narcotic, affects the credibility of our entire drug abuse program. 
Recent federal legislation and the passage of local marijuana ordinances give new 
urgency to the need for state action in this controversial area. 
(Emphasis added.) 
128. See H. PACKER, supra note 30, at 291; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE• 
MENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPoRT: THE Com.n-s 75-76 (196'7). CJ. 
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Deci• 
sions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 586-88 (1960); Kadish, Legal 
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failure of law enforcement officials to enforce unpopular laws fosters 
the same such disrespect.129 Therefore, grounds would exist, not 
unlike those asserted by Ann Arbor, for a parade of concurrent 
municipal regulation that would certainly appear horrible to those 
who recognize the values of statewide uniformity of the criminal 
law. Indeed, the spectre of each locality enacting its own criminal 
code, is different only in degree from the situation presented by 
the concurrent operation of the Ann Arbor marijuana ordinance 
and the State's Controlled Substances Act. 
While this problem does not admit of simple solution, it should 
not be insurmountable. The most fundamental answer is that 
municipalities are creatures of the State and, under the Michigan 
constitution and home-rule statute, have a limited authority and 
remain "subject to" the State's supreme command. Certainly the 
checks embodied in the municipal concern requirement and the 
pre-emption and conflict doctrines provide protection to the State 
should a municipality act adversely to the state welfare. Absent a 
clear indication of the legislative intent, the judicial determination 
of the appropriate limits of municipal power in Michigan has been 
shown to include, either expressly or implicitly, delicate questions 
of balance. The flexibility inherent in such a judicial inquiry allows 
careful consideration of the relevant competing policies, and renders 
unnecessary the promulgation of an angular standard to which later 
cases must be forced to conform. Finally, it should be kept in mind 
that the judicial determination is not the ultimate one in regard 
to these matters. Were the state legislature to take exception to 
certain municipal ordinances, even if upheld in the courts, it clearly 
would be within the power of the legislature to enact specific or 
general pre-emptive statutes to ensure that no significant state policy 
is impeded. Yet, as Michigan law has developed, no such scheme 
of pre-emptive statutes has been necessary, and the home-rule powers 
have been employed to secure to cities a healthy degree of autonomy 
in regard to matters of local concern. 
Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 904, 909-
10 (1962). 
129. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 7-8 
(1932). 
